Individual investors' wealth was hit hard by the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . Several months of double-digit negative stock-market returns almost halved investor portfolio values within the time period studied in this paper (April 2008 to March 2009 . This dramatic shock to investor wealth, combined with the market's high uncertainty and extreme volatility, may have induced individual investors to radically change their perceptions of the stock market and their investment behavior. According to the popular press, for example, the crisis made investors aware of the true risk of investing in stocks, lowered their return expectations and risk tolerance, increased their risk perceptions, and led them to de-risk their portfolios (Steverman 2009; Shell 2010) . Surprisingly, however, academic research on these issues remains scarce to date.
We fill this void in the literature and provide a comprehensive analysis of individual investor perceptions, their behavior, and the impact of perceptions on behavior during the financial crisis. To do so, we employ a unique panel-data set in which we combine monthly survey data with matching brokerage records. For each month between April 2008 and March 2009, we measure individual investors' perceptions in a survey on their expectations for stockmarket returns, as well as their risk tolerance and risk perceptions.
1 In addition, we collect information on these investors' trading and risk-taking behavior through their brokerage records.
The sample period includes, on the one hand, the months when worldwide stock markets were hit hardest, that is, September and October 2008. During these months, in the U.S., Lehman Brothers collapsed and AIG was bailed out, and in Europe, parts of ABN AMRO and Fortis were nationalized. On the other hand, stock markets were still relatively calm at the start of the sample period (April 2008) , while at the end of the sample period, stock markets began to recover (March 2009 ). As such, the sample period provides a relatively complete coverage of the crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents related literature and develops hypotheses. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 sets out the results. Section 4 presents robustness checks and evaluates alternative explanations. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and Hypotheses
Prior research shows that individual investors are subject to various behavioral biases, which seem to be rather persistent (Barber and Odean 2001; Bailey, Kumar, and Ng 2011) . Among these, individual investors have difficulty learning from their experiences, and if they learn, this is a slow process (Gervais and Odean 2001; Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman 2010) . Individual investors often fail to update their behavior to match their experiences and are relatively unaware of their return performance (Glaser and Weber 2007) . Thus, it seems that in normal times, Thaler (1985) , for example, show that investors tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events. In addition, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that dramatic experiences, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s in the U.S., may have a permanent impact on investor perceptions and risk-taking behavior. Finally, prior literature suggests that experiencing a number of consecutive losses reduces investors' subsequent willingness to take risks (Thaler and Johnson 1990; Barberis 2011) . As the financial crisis combines a severe shock to investor wealth with a highly uncertain and volatile market environment, we expect a strong and long-lasting impact on investor perceptions and behavior. As such, we develop the following hypotheses regarding investor perceptions (H 1 ) and risk-taking behavior (H 2 ) during the crisis: During a crisis, investors are exposed to a frequent stream of often dramatic and unexpected news events. Prior research shows that receiving (too) much information can lead to information overload, which stimulates status-quo bias, thus potentially reducing individual investors' trading activity during a crisis (cf. Agnew and Szykman 2005) . Alternatively, however, the large amount of new and potentially conflicting information that investors receive during a crisis may induce frequent changes in their perceptions, as well as a larger divergence of such perceptions (i.e., disagreement amongst various investors). Glaser and Weber (2005) , for example, find an increase in the standard deviation of individual investors' return and volatility forecasts directly after the terror attacks of September 11 and the subsequent stock-market turmoil. Changes in and divergence of perceptions are both expected to lead to higher trading activity: The first effect provides more reasons to trade, and the second effect makes it more likely for investors to find a trading counterpart (cf. Banerjee 2011 
Data
We base our analyses on the brokerage records of a sample of 1,510 clients of the largest discount broker in the Netherlands and on matching monthly questionnaire data that we collected for these individual investors from April 2008 through March 2009. Using discount-brokerage data ensures that observed trading patterns, as well as survey responses, reflect investors' own decision making and opinions and not those of an advisor. An additional advantage is that discount brokers represent the dominant channel through which both U.S. and Dutch individuals invest in the stock market today (Barber and Odean 2000; Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009) . As in Bauer et al. (2009) , we exclude accounts owned by minors (age < 18 years) and accounts with an average end-of-month portfolio value (within the sample period) of less than €250. Furthermore, we limit the sample to individual investors. To exclude professional traders, we discard accounts in the top 1% of annual trading volume, number of transactions, or turnover distributions. Imposing these criteria leaves 1,376 individual accounts for investigation.
Brokerage Records
Brokerage records are available for investors who completed at least one survey during the sample period. A "record" consists of an identification number, a transaction date and time, a buy/sell indicator, the type of asset traded, the gross transaction value, and transaction commissions. The records also contain information on investors' daily account balances, demographics such as age and gender, as well as their 6-digit postal code. Based on this postal code, which is unique to each street (or even parts of a street) in the Netherlands, and data from Statistics Netherlands (Central Bureau of Statistics), we assign income and residential house value to each investor. Variables are defined in Table 1 . Table 2 shows descriptive statistics.
[ Tables 1-2 here] A comparison with samples used in other studies of individual investor behavior in the United
States (Barber and Odean 2000) , Germany (Dorn and Huberman 2005) , and the Netherlands (Bauer et al., 2009) shows that the sample is similar with regard to key characteristics, although trading activity is slightly higher. Comparing the average account value of the surveyed investors to the average account value of €50,000-60,000 for Dutch individual investors in general (Bauer et al., 2009) suggests that the average investor in our sample invests more than three-fourths of her total self-managed portfolio with this broker. Over 40% of survey respondents hold an investment account only with this particular broker. Of the respondents who also have accounts with other brokers, more than 50% indicate that the other account(s) comprise(s) less than half their total investment portfolio. Together with the reasons outlined above, this paper's sample of investors seems sufficiently representative to justify extrapolating our results to the broader population of self-directed individual investors. As there is no capital gains tax under the Dutch tax system, the data and results are not affected by tax-loss selling motivated trading.
Survey Data
At A possible concern with samples of investors such as the one used in this study is that monthly variation of non-response (see Table 2 ) might not be random. For example, investment success could be related to the likelihood to respond. Robustness checks in Section 4.1 show that our sample is not subject to such non-random response behavior problems.
The survey elicited information on investors' expectations of stock-market returns, their risk tolerance, and their risk perceptions for each upcoming month (see Table 3 ). To ensure a valid measurement of these variables, we use tested and well-established scales from the psychometric literature (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994) . Return expectations reflect the extent to which a respondent is optimistic about her investment portfolio and corresponding returns and are measured following Weber et al. (2010) . Risk tolerance reflects a respondent's predisposition toward financial risk (like or dislike of risky situations) and is measured following Pennings and Smidts (2000) . Risk perception reflects a respondent's interpretation of the riskiness of the stock market and is measured according to Pennings and Wansink (2004 weighted scores using factor analysis, but have the advantage of expressing a readily interpretable absolute modal meaning (Dillon and McDonald 2001, p. 62 ).
[ Table 3 here]
Tests of Hypotheses

Investor Perceptions during the Crisis
In this section we test hypothesis H 1 . That is, we examine whether the financial crisis has a depressing effect on investor perceptions (H 1a ), and if so, whether this effect is long-lasting (H 1b) . Thaler's (1985) result that investors overweight the recent past when forming return expectations.
We find similar effects for risk tolerance and risk perception (Figure 2 investors' return volatility remains at a higher level than that of the market, with the magnitude of the difference staying at the same level as in September-October. Additional (untabulated) tests that consider the cash position in investors' accounts confirm these results. Total account volatility (i.e., the sum of the investment portfolio and cash) is generally lower than portfolio volatility (e.g., -6 percentage points in April 2008). It also spikes at the height of the crisis.
Again, we find that toward the end of the crisis, account volatility is higher than at its beginning [ Figure 4 here]
To gain more insight into the factors that drive individual investors' risk-taking behavior, we regress their portfolio standard deviation and buy-sell ratio on their perceptions. We run panel regressions in which investor perceptions are included as explanatory variables in their onemonth lagged levels and changes (revisions) from that month to infer how perceptions at the start of a month, and changes in perceptions during a month, influence behavior. This approach differentiates the general effect of levels of investor perceptions (e.g., always having high risk tolerance and high trading activity) from specific effects of revisions in perceptions and resulting behavior. That is, we examine whether the monthly fluctuations in investor perceptions are an important ingredient for understanding investor behavior, or whether only the levels of perceptions matter. We control for other investor characteristics that prior literature suggests as drivers of investor behavior, such as gender, age, account tenure, income, portfolio value, house value, derivative usage, and dividend choice. Results are presented in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 here] Table 4 shows that studying the dynamics of investors' perceptions leads to a better understanding of their risk-taking behavior during the crisis. Both the levels of and revisions in risk tolerance, as well as the levels of risk perception, are associated with risk taking. That is, With respect to buy-sell ratios, we find that investors with higher levels of and upward revisions in risk tolerance, lower levels of risk perceptions, less experience (shorter account tenure), more wealth (higher average house value), and lower levels of derivatives usage have higher buy-sell ratios (second column in Table 4 ). That is, more risk-tolerant investors increase their exposure to the market, while investors who perceive higher risk lower their exposure.
Overall, the results of this section lead us to reject hypotheses H 2a and H 2b . The financial crisis did not induce individual investors to de-risk their portfolios. This behavior is rooted in the time-variation of investor perceptions: Since risk tolerance and risk perception quickly return to pre-crisis levels, and these measures are important drivers of portfolio risk and buy-sell ratios, investors did not reduce their portfolio risk. Although temporarily dramatic, the crisis thus does not seem to have a long-lasting effect on individual investors' risk-taking behavior.
Investor Trading Activity during the Crisis
In this section we test hypothesis H 3 . That is, we examine whether experiencing a crisis leads individual investors to decrease (H 3a ) or increase (H 3b ) their trading activity. Figure 5 plots the fraction of investors that trades each month and their turnover, and shows that the likelihood of trading and turnover increase sharply during the height of the crisis (September-October 2008).
[ Figure 5 here]
The sharp increase in trading activity, as shown in Figure 5 , makes it unlikely that information overload, and the associated lower trading activity, plays a major role for individual investors during the financial crisis. Increasing trading activity alone, however, is insufficient to rule out potential information overload effects. Therefore, we also regress investor trading activity on their perceptions and variables shown to be linked to susceptibility for information overload. Agnew and Szykman (2005) show that financially literate and experienced investors, that is, those with longer account tenure, higher income, and larger portfolio values, suffer less from information overload. These investors have less difficulty interpreting the frequent and sometimes conflicting information that arrives during a crisis. Therefore, we expect them to have a lower tendency to be overwhelmed by crisis events that could have led them to refrain from trading. As such, if information overload plays an important role, trading activity (i.e., likelihood to trade and turnover) should be positively related to financial literacy and experience. We find that income is indeed positively related to the likelihood of trading, while other measures of investor sophistication display conflicting signs. Table 5 thus confirms the graphical evidence of Figure 5 : Information overload does not seem to play an important role during the crisis.
[ Table 5 here]
As we do not find evidence in support of hypothesis H 3a , we next test hypothesis H 3b . That is, we examine whether more reasons (changes in perceptions) and opportunities to trade (divergence of perceptions) explain the increase in trading activity, as observed in Figure 5 . Both in the likelihood of trading and the turnover regressions, most perception coefficients are significant ( Güntay and Hackbarth 2010; Banerjee 2011). Figure 6 plots the divergence of investor perceptions during the crisis and shows that divergence tends to co-move with trading activity.
These results lead us to reject H 3a and accept H 3b . That is, the increased trading activity during the height of the crisis is related to changes in perceptions as well as higher divergence of perceptions. In other words, investors have more reasons as well as more opportunities to trade.
[ Figure 6 here]
Robustness Checks and Tests of Alternative Explanations
Sample Selection Bias
A general concern with studies using surveys is that response behavior could be non-random. To examine this issue, we first compare the investors that responded to the survey to the broker's overall investor population, followed by an analysis of the monthly variation of non-response.
As described in Section 2, brokerage records are available only for investors who average, more likely to be male (95% vs. 91%, p = 0.000) and older (3.25 years, p = 0.000), have larger portfolios (€10.956, p = 0.000), and are more likely to trade (55% vs. 39%, p = 0.000). No significant differences are found regarding their number of trades (given that they traded).
In the following, the characteristics of all investors who responded to the [2008] [2009] survey are compared with those of the non-responding investors for each month using the 2008-2009 brokerage-account data. Table 6 presents mean differences between respondents and nonrespondents. To examine whether non-response is related to investor behavior or performance, investors' trading and risk-taking variables, returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas are also analyzed.
[ Table 6 here]
Comparing respondent with non-respondent means shows that in some months there are significant differences, especially with respect to age, account tenure, and trading activity. In these months, respondents, compared to non-respondents, are older, have longer account tenure, and are more likely to trade, whereas their overall transaction volume is smaller. (Figure 1 ).
To account for the identified differences between respondents and non-respondents, as well as the monthly variation in significant differences, an inverse-probability-weighted estimator is applied (Robins and Rotnitzky 1995; Wooldridge 2002) . For each of the 12 months, a logit model is estimated where the dependent variable indicates either response (1) or non-response (0). As explanatory variables, the set of variables contained in Table 6 is included. Next, the predicted probabilities of survey response are calculated. Finally, all regression models of Section 3 are estimated again using the inverse of the predicted probabilities as sample weights.
The results of the regressions that include this estimator are similar to those obtained from the original specifications in terms of coefficient magnitudes, significance, and signs (detailed results available upon request). Exceptions are the turnover regression where we identify that, To examine this alternative explanation, Panels A and B of Table 7 first present the correlations of the levels of and revisions in perceptions with the levels of and changes in the market and individual investor returns, respectively. Since perceptions are measured at the end of each month, while returns are realized over the course of each month, Table 7 contains the contemporaneous correlations to detect an impact of past returns on current perceptions.
Investor Perceptions versus Past Returns as Drivers of Behavior
[ Table 7 here]
Although the levels and changes in perceptions are correlated with both the levels and changes in the market and individual investor returns, all correlations are relatively low and far from unity.
This gives first evidence that investors' perceptions provide additional information over and beyond the information included in their past returns. In addition, Table 8 breaks down the changes in investor perceptions on a monthly basis and distinguishes between investors with positive and negative past returns, as well as changes in past returns.
[ Table 8 here] Table 8 shows that, in most months, average return expectations and risk tolerance move in the same direction, while risk perceptions move in the opposite direction of both market returns show that the levels of investors' past returns have no significant effect in any of the regression models. Changes in investors' past returns do impact behavior, but including them does not eliminate the explanatory power of investor perceptions (detailed results available upon request).
In line with Statman et al.'s (2006) findings, changes in investors' past returns have a significant effect in the turnover regression (β = 0.013, p = 0.004), which also includes past returns as a control variable, and in the buy-sell ratio regression models that include only the investors' change in past returns, as well as both the past returns and change in past returns (β = 0.011, p = 0.000 in both models). The significance, signs, and approximate magnitudes of the investor perception coefficients do not change in any of the regression models. The only exception is that in the risk-taking (standard deviation of portfolio return) regression models that include the change in past returns, or both the past returns and the change in past returns, the coefficient for the change in risk perception becomes significant and positive (β = 0.009, p = 0.072 in both models). All in all, the analyses of this section show that investor perceptions not only pick up information from past returns, but they also provide explanatory power for investor behavior well beyond the previously documented effect of past returns and changes in past returns.
Relevance of Investor Risk-Taking and Trading Behavior During the Crisis
Results of Section 3 show that investor perceptions and fluctuations therein are important drivers of investor behavior. The aspects of trading and risk-trading behavior that we study have been shown to be related to investor performance during normal market periods. Thus, economically, they matter. In this section we assess whether, also during the financial crisis, the behavioral variables that we study are related to investor performance, and thus have relevance in this particular period. To do so, we regress three measures of investor performance on investor behavior and a set of controls. As performance measures, we study investors' portfolio return, their Sharpe-Ratio, and their one-factor (Jensen's) alpha. 2 The aspects of investor behavior that we include are based on Section 3: We examine the impact of the standard deviation of investors' portfolio return, as well as that of their buy-sell ratio, likelihood to trade, and turnover.
Note that, since investment risk is already accounted for in the dependent variable in the SharpeRatio and alpha regression, only in the portfolio-return regression do we include the standard deviation of returns as an independent variable. The results of Table 9 show that the behavioral variables that we consider in this paper are important drivers of investor performance during the financial crisis. As overall market returns were mostly negative during the sample period, both portfolio risk (standard deviation) and the buy-sell ratio are negatively associated with performance. In addition, trading activity (turnover), is negatively related to performance, consistent with results obtained in normal market periods (Barber and Odean 2000) . Overall, these regression results provide evidence that the investor behaviors that we study during the financial crisis are economically relevant.
[ Table 9 here]
Conclusion
In this paper, we combine monthly survey data with matching brokerage records to create a unique set of panel data that shows how individual investor perceptions change and drive trading return expectations and risk tolerance sharply decline, while their risk perceptions strongly increase. Towards the end of the crisis, however, return expectations, risk tolerance, and risk perceptions quickly recover. We find substantial swings in trading and risk-taking behavior during the crisis that are driven by changes in investor perceptions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, individual investors did not stop trading altogether or de-risk their portfolios.
In fact, as perceptions recovered, trading and risk-taking behavior soon returned to pre-crisis levels. Thus, although the uncertainty and volatility of the financial crisis had a significant effect on investors' perceptions and behavior, these effects do not seem to be particularly long-lasting.
This study provides two insights for asset pricing. First, in contrast to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) , we show that investor's risk tolerance is time-varying (see Figure 2 ) and significantly related to risk-taking behavior (see the risk-taking regression). Investor's portfolio risk, however, seems to move in parallel with market risk (see Figure 3) , as if changes in risk tolerance had no material impact. Hence, it may be investor inertia, that is, the large fraction of investors not trading during the sample period (see Figure 5 ), as well as rebalancing behavior after price changes (see Figure 4 and the buy-sell ratio regression), that ultimately drives portfolio risk. The impact of time-varying risk tolerance on risk-taking behavior discovered here may be masked and overcompensated by the impact of investor inertia found by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) . Second, although the sample period does not cover the time before the crisis, this paper's findings on the evolution of investor perceptions shed light on the psychological factors contributing to the asset-price bubble preceding the crisis. Barberis (2011) Dividend Choice Stock Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the investor's preferred way to receive dividend is stock dividend or 0 in case of a preference for cash dividend.
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock
Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the investor's preferred way to receive dividend is stock dividend for one of her subaccounts and cash for another subaccount or 0 in case of a preference for cash dividend for all her subaccounts.
Average Trade Size The investor's monthly volume divided by her trades.
Buy-Sell Ratio Difference between volume buy and volume sell, normalized (divided) by volume. For investors with no trades in a particular month, this ratio is set to zero (such investors mimic an investor with equal buy and sell volume).
Return
Monthly investor return given by the product of the daily relative changes in the value of her portfolio after transaction costs and portfolio in-and outflows.
Sharpe Ratio Return divided by the standard deviation of return.
Alpha
Monthly one-factor alpha (Jensen's alpha).
Return Expectation
Reflects how optimistic a respondent is about her investment portfolio and its returns in the upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 .
Risk Tolerance
Reflects a respondent's general predisposition toward financial risk. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 .
Risk Perception
Reflects a respondent's interpretation of how risky the stock market will be in the upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 .
Because of data availability, data retrieved from Statistics Netherlands refer to different years, that is, to 2007 for income and to 2008 for house value. This table presents monthly summary statistics for the brokerage account data. Panel A refers to all investors for whom brokerage records are available. This sample includes investors who participated at least once during the entire sample period in the survey and who were not excluded by the sample-selection restrictions as defined in section 2. The monthly summary statistics presented in Panel B refer to the subset of investors who responded to the survey in each respective month. Variables are defined in Table 1 . Table 3 Survey Questions
This table presents the questions as used in this study's 12 consecutive monthly surveys. A 7-point Likert scale is used to record investors' response to each question. Each survey variable (return expectation, risk tolerance, risk perception) is calculated as the equally weighted average of the respective survey questions. * denotes a reversescored question. All survey variables are measured using psychometrically validated measurement scales (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Cronbach's alpha is between 0.71 and 0.89 for all survey variables, indicating the measurement instrument is reliable (Hair et al. 1998 ).
Survey Variable Answer Categories
Return Expectation (1 = low/pessimistic, 7 = high/optimistic)
Next month, I expect my investments to do less well than desired. 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) For the next month, I have a positive feeling about my financial future.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Next month, my investments will have a worse performance than those of most other investors.
(totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Next month, it is unlikely that my investment behavior will lead to positive returns.
For the next month, the future of my investment portfolio looks good.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Risk Tolerance (1 = low risk tolerance, 7 = high risk tolerance)
Next month, I prefer certainty over uncertainty when investing.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Next month, I avoid risks when investing.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Next month, I do not like to take financial risks.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Next month, I do not like to "play it safe" when investing.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Risk Perception (1 = low perceived risk, 7 = high perceived risk)
I consider investing to be very risky next month.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) I consider investing to be safe next month.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) I consider investing to be dangerous next month. * 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) I consider investing to have little risk next month.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) This table presents the results from regressions of risk-taking behavior on investor perceptions and a set of control variables. Dependent variables are the standard deviation of investors' daily portfolio returns and the buy-sell ratio. The columns show results of linear panel models for the full sample (standard deviation of return) and for the truncated sample of investors who have at least one trade in a particular month (buy-sell ratio). The number of individual investors included the first regression (1,041) is smaller than the sample available for analysis (1,376), because not all investors responded to the survey for two consecutive months. Standard errors are clustered on the investor level. Variables are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents Table 1 . *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents the monthly differences in means between respondents and non-respondents. Variables are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** denote statistical significant differences in means between respondents and non-respondents at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 . *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 3 ); shown is the sample mean. A small value indicates low return expectations, whereas a large value indicates high return expectations. AEX return is the total return of the Dutch stock market index. *, **, *** denote statistical significant differences between the means for subsequent month pairs for return expectations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 3 ); shown is the sample mean. For illustrative purposes, risk perception is shown on an inverted scale. A small value indicates low risk tolerance or high perceived risk, whereas a large value indicates high risk tolerance or low perceived risk. AEX return is the total return of the Dutch stock market index. * (+), ** (++), *** (+++) denote statistical significant differences between the means for subsequent month pairs for risk tolerance (risk perception) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 . Table 1 . Table 1 .
